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I. QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
A. Does a physician, consulted for a second opinion, who 
makes statements reflective of alleged substandard care rendered 
by the first physician, (not in the context of an expert opinion 
for litigation) owe a duty of care to the first physician when it 
is reasonably foreseeable that the other physician will suffer 
harm if the second physician's statements are negligently 
conceived? 
B. Does the State of Utah recognize an action for injurious 
falsehood, and, if so, what is the statute of limitations for 
such a cause of action. 
II. COURT OF APPEALS DECISION 
An Order of Affirmance of the summary judgment of the 
District Court was entered on the 13th day of June, 1989. (A 
true and accurate copy of said Order is contained in the 
Appendix). 
III. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This case comes before this Court on appeal from an Order of 
Affirmation of the judgment of the District Court which was 
entered on the 13th day of June, 1989. Summary judgment was 
granted in favor of Defendant/Respondent on the 23rd day of May, 
1988. Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Annotated §78-2-2(3)(a) and §78-2-2(5) (1953) as amended. 
IV. CONTROLLING STATUTES 
U.C.A. §78-12-25(3) (1953) as amended: 
Within four years: 
(3) An action for relief not otherwise 
provided for by law. 
U.C.A. §78-12-29(4) (1953) as amended: 
Within one year: 
(4) An action for libel, slander, assault, battery, 
false imprisonment, or seduction. 
V 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This action was initiated against Defendant-Respondent for 
negligence and injurious falsehood on October 23, 1987. At issue 
were certain harmful representations about the quality of certain 
medical procedures performed by the Plaintiff-Petitioner made by 
the Defendant-Respondent to third parties. 
On or about May 23, 1988, Judge Leonard H. Russon granted 
Defendant-Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment finding that 
Defendant owed no duty of care to Plaintiff and that Plaintiff's 
claims of injurious falsehood were barred by the one year statute 
of limitations of U.C.A. §78-12-29(4) (1953) as amended. Notice 
of appeal was filed on or about June 3, 1988. The appeal was 
originally filed with this Court but was "poured over" to the 
Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the District 
Court's Summary Judgment on June 13, 1989 without rendering an 
opinion pursuant to Rule 31, R.U.C.A. 
VI 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In or about June, 1982, Petitioner treated Teresa Ilene 
White for injuries she received in an auto-pedestrian accident. 
Petitioner set White's leg which had been severely fractured. 
Subsequently, White developed alignment deformities secondary to 
the fracture. (Amended Complaint, Para. 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9; 
Amended Answer, Para.2,3 and 4). 
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On or about October 10, 1983, Ms. White consulted the 
Defendant-Respondent, Dr. Lonnie E. Paulos, (hereinafter 
"Respondent" or "Respondent") for the purpose of evaluating the 
condition of her right tibia. (Amended Complaint, Para. 10; 
Respondent's response to Interrogatory No. 2). Respondent 
represented to Ms. White that the problems associated with her 
right leg were attributable to the malposition of her tibial 
fracture fragments which resulted from a procedure employed by 
Petitioner and the subsequent tolerance by Petitioner of an 
excessive degree of recurvatum and varus in the tibia. These 
representations were made without reference by Respondent to 
Petitioner's records or the records and X-rays of Cottonwood 
Hospital. (Amended Complaint, Para. 11; Answer Para. 6). 
Later, in letters dated October 25, 1983, December 6, 1983, 
and April 2, 1984, Respondent communicated to Ms. White's legal 
counsel that the tibial position tolerated by Appellant was 
inconsistent with acceptable community standards and suggested 
that surgical correction in the form of an osteotomy should be 
entertained by Ms. White. (Amended Complaint, Para. 12; 
Respondent's response to Interrogatory No. 2 and 9; Answer Para. 
6) . For his evaluations and preparation of reports with his 
findings and opinions, Respondent received remuneration from Ms. 
White's counsel. (Respondent's Response to Interrogatory No. 9). 
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As a consequence of Respondent's communication with 
Ms. White's counsel, a lawsuit was filed in the Third Judicial 
District Court alleging that Petitioner was professionally 
negligent in his treatment of Ms. White. Said lawsuit against 
Appellant was ultimately dismissed with no settlement as a result 
of independent medical examinations of Ms. White by other 
orthopedic surgeons in Salt Lake County, who determined that 
Respondent's measurement of the alleged tibial aberration was 
inaccurate and that the degree of alignment deformity tolerated 
by Petitioner was well within community standards. (Amended 
Complaint, Para. 12; Appellant's response to Interrogatory No. 1, 
2 and 4). 
As a result of the lawsuit initiated by Ms. White, 
Petitioner was forced to expend sums in shared defense costs and 
experienced a dramatic increase in insurance premiums. 
(Appellant's Response to Interrogatory No. 3). Petitioner 
initiated an action against Respondent for negligence and 
injurious falsehood on October 23, 1987. (See Complaint). After 
answering the Complaint and taking some discovery, Respondent 
responded with a Motion for Summary Judgment, arguing, first: 
that he owed no duty to Petitioner since Petitioner was not in a 
contractual, fiduciary or physician/patient relationship with 
him; and second: that the one year statute of limitations 
applicable to libel and slander barred Petitioner's action for 
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injurious falsehood. Summary judgment was granted in favor of 
Respondent on or about May 23, 1988. 
VII 
ARGUMENT 
I. BECAUSE IT WAS REASONABLY FORESEEABLE THAT RESPONDENT'S 
ACTIONS WOULD HARM PETITIONER, RESPONDENT HAD A DUTY TO ACT IN A 
NON-NEGLIGENT MANNER. 
The Utah Supreme Court has defined the "essential elements" 
of a negligence action as "(1) a duty of reasonable care owed by 
the Defendant to the Plaintiff; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) 
the causation, both actual and proximate of injury; and (4) the 
suffering of damages by the Plaintiff". Williams v. Melby, 699 
P. 2d 723 (Utah 1985). 
The Respondent contends that because there was not a 
contractual relationship between he and Petitioner, he had no 
duty to act in a non-negligent manner toward Petitioner. That a 
contractual relationship is necessary before an individual has a 
duty to act in a non-negligent manner is not the law of this, nor 
any other state. Maian v. Lewis, 693 P. 2d 661, 672 n. 15 (Utah 
1981). See also Nazareno v. Urie. 638 P. 2d 671 (Alaska 1981); 
Metropolitan Gas Repair Serv. Inc. , v. Kulik, 621 P. 2d 313 
(Colo. 1981); Waggoner v. W. W. Steel Co., 657 P. 2d 147 (Okl. 
1982); American Reciprocal Insurers v. Bessonette, 405 P. 2d 529 
(Or. 1965). Instead, a proper analysis of the question of duty 
in this case must focus on the foreseeability of harm to 
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Petitioner from Respondent's actions. Palscrraf v. Long Island 
R.R., 162 N.E. 99 (Ct. App. NY. 1928). 
Where damages are foreseeable, there is a general duty to 
act so as to avoid them. Milliner v. Elmer Fox and Co., 529 P. 
2d 806, 808 (Utah 1974). Therefore, if damages from negligently 
making a false statement are foreseeable, even without privity, 
one may be held liable. Christensen v. Commonwealth Land Title 
Insurance Co. , 666 P. 2d 302 (Utah 1983) ; See also Ducran v. Jones 
615 P. 2d 1293 (Utah 1980). 
In the present case, Respondent could reasonably foresee 
that Petitioner would be harmed by his negligent actions. 
Respondent communicated to Ms. White and her counsel that the 
work performed by Petitioner was below the standards of care in 
the community. Respondent obviously knew that such statements 
could damage Petitioner and therefore he had a duty to act in a 
non-negligent manner. 
Petitioner contends that the instant action was improperly 
dismissed on Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment. Grave 
questions remain unresolved on the propriety of Respondent's 
statements to Ms. White and her attorney, which were made without 
any reference to medical records and X-rays produced by 
Petitioner and Cottonwood Hospital before Ms. White's visit to 
Respondent. Questions also remain on the professional skill 
exercised by Respondent in the measurement of Ms. White's alleged 
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tibial aberration. Certainly it cannot be said as a matter of 
law that Petitioner could never be a reasonably foreseeable 
victim of negligent misrepresentations concerning the quality of 
his skill as a surgeon. Such foreseeability creates a duty as a 
matter of law. Petitioner must therefore be allowed to argue the 
question of negligence to a jury. 
II. THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DOES NOT BAR APPELLANT'S SUIT, 
SINCE INJURIOUS FALSEHOOD IS NOT GOVERNED BY THE ONE YEAR 
LIMITATION APPLICABLE TO LIBEL AND SLANDER. 
Respondent contends that Petitioner's injurious falsehood 
cause of action is actually a claim for libel and/or slander and 
therefore is governed by the one year statute of limitations 
contained in 78-12-29 of the Utah Code Annotated. Respondent 
reasons that since Petitioner did not initiate legal action until 
some three years after Respondent wrote the subject letters to 
Ms. White's attorney, Petitioner's action for injurious falsehood 
is time barred. Respondent and the lower courts have failed to 
recognize that a claim for injurious falsehood is not the same as 
a claim for libel and/or slander and therefore does not fall 
under the one year statute of limitations contained in 878-12-29 
of the Utah Code Annotated, but under the four year general 
statute of limitations contained in 978-12-25. 
Although an action for injurious falsehood is loosely allied 
to defamation, they are not the same. Prosser and Keaton on 
Torts, Section 128, P. 963. (5th Ed. 1984). See also Idaho 
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Norland Corp,, v. Caelter Industries, Inc., 509 Fed. Supp. 1070 
(D. Colo. 1981); Guess, Inc., v. Superior Court, 122 Cal. Rptr. 
79, 82 (Cal. App. 1986). Injurious falsehoods such as trade 
libel or product disparagement interfere with an individual's 
business. Unlike classical defamation, an injurious falsehood is 
not directed at an individual's reputation, but rather at the 
goods an individual sells or the character of his business or 
practice. See Prosser at 964. 
In Idaho Norland the U. S. District Court for the District 
of Colorado dealt with the issue of which statute of limitations 
should apply for an injurious falsehood, an issue identical to 
that raised in the instant case. In drawing a distinction 
between claims for injurious falsehood and those for defamation 
the District court stated that: 
Claims of trade libel and product disparagement protect 
economic relationships and fair competition. They are 
akin to private claims under anti-trust laws and other 
forms of trade regulations. The law of defamation, on 
the other hand, provides for 'protection of private 
personality' and reflects 'our basic concept of 
essential dignity and worth of every human being'. 
Id. at 1072. Using this reasoning, the Court concluded that a 
claim for injurious falsehood and defamation are not the same. 
Therefore, Colorado's one year libel and slander statute of 
limitations did not apply to actions for injurious falsehood. 
The Court went on to conclude that Colorado's six year statute of 
limitations for actions based on common law pleadings was the 
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appropriate limitation governing Plaintiff's injurious falsehood 
claims. 
As shown above, Petitioner's cause of action for injurious 
falsehood cannot be characterized as an action for libel and/or 
slander and therefore is not limited by the one year statute 
applicable to libel and slander actions. Because there is not a 
specific statute of limitations applicable to actions for 
injurious falsehood, the trial court should have applied the 
general four year statute of limitations contained in Section 78-
12-25(3) of the Utah Code Annotated, as "[a]n action for relief 
not otherwise provided for by law". Since Petitioner filed his 
action against Respondent within the four year limitation 
applicable to an injurious falsehood action, summary judgment in 
Respondent's favor based on the statute of limitations was 
improper. / 
Respectfully submitted this ^ day of July, 1989. 
HATCH, MORTON & SKEEN 
/// 
tONALD C. WOLTHUIS 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that four copies of the foregoing Petition 
for Writ of Certiorari were mailed to J. Anthony Eyre, at Kipp & 
Christian, City Centre I, #330, 1/75 East Fourth South, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84111 on this ft- day of
 /tj"uly,/l989. . 
IONALD C. WO 70LTHUIS 
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Tab A 
B L E D 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
OOOOO 
Dr. Jonathan Home, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Dr. Lonnie E. Paulos, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
J^N 134889 
Uau. Govt *i >£W** 
ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE 
Case No. 880461-CA 
Before Judges Garff, Davidson and Croft (Retired District Judge 
Sitting by Special Assignment) (On Rule 31 Hearing). 
The summary judgment of the district court is affirmed. 
5ATED^tiis 13th day of June, 1989. 
rOR THE COURT: 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the day of June, 1989, a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE was mailed to 
each of the parties named below by depositing the same in the United 
States mail. 
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J, Anthony Eyre 
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Third District Court 
Salt Lake County 
Dixon Hindley, Clerk 
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